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ABSTRACT
In the Republic Plato draws a  distinction among goods between (1) those that
are good in themselves but not good for their consequences, (2) those that are
good both in themselves and for their consequences, and (3) those that are not
good in themselves but are good for their consequences. This paper presents an
interpretation of this classi￿cation, in particular its application to the case of jus-
tice. It is argued that certain causal consequences of justice as well as factors
that are not causal consequences of justice are relevant in explaining why justice
is good in itself; and that it is only the reputation for justice and the causal con-
sequences that follow from that reputation that are relevant in explaining why it
is good for its consequences. 
In  the  Republic, Glaucon  and  Adeimantus  ask  Socrates  to  prove  that  a
person is better off by being just rather than by being unjust.1 When they
explain how they want Socrates to prove this, they say the following:
1. Socrates should show what effect justice and injustice have on the soul irre-
spective of reputation (358b, 366e).
2. Socrates should praise justice itself (358d, 366e).
3. Socrates should show how justice in and by itself affects a man for good, and
how injustice in and by itself affects a man for evil (367b, d).
Therefore, to  prove  that justice  is superior to injustice Plato must prove
that justice is an intrinsic good and injustice is an intrinsic evil. There is
nothing  else (prior  to  Rep. 612b)  that  Plato  attempts  to  argue  over  and
above this in trying to establish that the just life is better than the unjust
life.
Hence, to understand PlatoÕs argument it is crucial to understand what,
in PlatoÕs view, makes it the case that justice is an intrinsic good. And to
understand  this we must  understand  the division  of goods  set out at the
start  of  Book  II.  There  Plato  divides  goods  into  those  that  are  good 
in themselves but not for their consequences, those that are good both in
themselves  and  for  their  consequences,  and  those  that  are  not  good  in
themselves but are good for their consequences. 
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There  is  disagreement  on  how  this  classi￿ cation  is  to  be  understood.
Two interpretations have been proposed:
1. Plato divides goods into 
i. things which are  good independently of  any  consequences they may 
have,
ii. things which are  good both independently of  any  consequences they 
may have and because of certain consequences they have, and
iii. things which are good only because of certain consequences they have.2
2. Plato divides goods into 
i. things which are good because they have one kind of consequence, 
ii. things which are  good both because they have a  consequence  of the 
sort speci￿ ed in (i) and because they have a second kind of consequence, 
and
iii. things which are good solely because they have the second kind of con-
sequence.
3
I believe that both  interpretations  are wrong,  and will argue for the fol-
lowing view:
3. Plato divides goods into 
i. things which are good (a) independently of any consequences they may 
have, and/or are good (b) because they have one kind of consequence,
ii. things which are good both because of (i) and because they have a second 
kind of consequence other than that referred to in (i)(b), and
iii. things which are  good solely because they have the  second kind of 
consequence – that speci￿ ed in (i)(b).
Or, at least, this is what is required in order to understand what Plato says
about the cases of justice and injustice and the RepublicÕs argument that
justice  pays.  It  may  well  be  that  a  coherent  general  interpretation  of
PlatoÕs division of goods is not possible.  
2 C. Kirwan, ÒGlauconÕs ChallengeÓ, Phronesis 10 (1965), 162-73; T. Irwin, PlatoÕs
Moral Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), 184 (hereafter PMT); J.D. Mabbott,
ÒIs PlatoÕs Republic Utilitarian?Ó in G. Vlastos (ed.), Plato II (Notre Dame: University
of Notre Dame Press, 1978), 57-65; C.D. Reeve, Philosopher-Kings, (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1988), 282 n. 19.
3 M.B.  Foster, ÒA Mistake of PlatoÕs in the Republic,Ó  Mind 46 (1937), 386-93;
David  Sachs,  ÒA  Fallacy  in  PlatoÕs Republic,Ó  in  N.  Smith  (ed.), Plato: Critical
Assessments (London: Routledge, 1998), 208-10; N. White, A Companion to PlatoÕs
Republic (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1979), 78; ÒThe Classi￿cation of Goods in PlatoÕs
Republic,Ó  Journal of  the  History of  Philosophy 22  (1984), 393-421; J. Annas, An
Introduction to PlatoÕs Republic (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), 348-9; N. Pappas,
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To avoid  confusion  it is necessary  to  distinguish  between  PlatoÕs use
of the word ÒconsequenceÓ and the contemporary notion of a causal con-
sequence. For, as I will argue, while Plato calls (e.g.) justice an intrinsic
good,
4 and hence something  that is good  independently  of what he calls
Òconsequences,Ó  its  intrinsic  goodness  is  not  independent  of  what  we
would call its causal consequences. So I will distinguish between Òconse-
quencesÓ – consequences  irrelevant to a thingÕs intrinsic goodness  – and
causal consequences.  ÒConsequenceÓ on its own will always refer to the
type of consequence which Plato has in mind. On my interpretation, some
causal consequences of a thing may be excluded from the ÒconsequencesÓ
of that thing and, hence, may determine it to be something which, for that
reason, is intrinsically good or evil.
5
I
I begin by arguing for two claims. First, the descriptions of class (iii) in
the  above  interpretations  fail  to  make  clear  a  crucial  point:  anything
belonging  to  this  class  must  be  an intrinsic evil. Secondly,  the  fact that
something  has good  causal consequences  may be  part of what makes  it
Ògood in itself.Ó
Members of the Third Class of Goods are Intrinsic Evils
Here is what Plato has to say about the different kinds of good when he
introduces them at 357b-358a:
First class of goods:
1. We do not welcome them for their consequences.
2. We do welcome them for the sake of themselves.
3. Examples: 1. enjoyment (tò xaÛrein)
2. pleasures (aß ²donaÛ) which have two features:
a. they are harmless
b. nothing  comes to  be from  them  except  enjoyment  (tò 
xaÛrein).
4 I  use  Òintrinsic goodÓ  and Òinstrumental goodÓ  to  mean  what  Plato means 
by Òsomething that we welcome for itselfÓ and Òsomething that we welcome for its
consequences.Ó
5 I assume that Plato divides evils (kak‹) in a way that matches his division of
goods, and in particular that the manner in which Plato applies it to justice also applies
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Second class of goods:
1. We welcome them for the sake of themselves.
2. We welcome them for the sake of their consequences. 
3. Examples: thought, sight, health.
Third class of goods:
1. They are painful or laborious (¤pÛpona).
2. They bene￿ t us because of their consequences.
3. We would not choose them for themselves.
4. We would choose them for the sake of their consequences.
5. The  consequences  for  the  sake of which we  would choose them include 
rewards and other bene￿ ts that they produce.
6. Examples: exercise, receiving medical treatment when ill, the practice of med-
icine and other ways of making money.
Plato  draws  up  similar  classi￿ cations  in  other  dialogues.  The  Gorgias
(467c-468a) presents a tripartite division  between goods,  evils and inter-
mediates, where intermediates can be good, evil or indifferent, depending
on the particular circumstances. The RepublicÕs third class of goods does
not include anything  that could be regarded as something that is in itself
indifferent or intermediate. That class is not adequately speci￿ ed by noting
that its members have consequences that are intrinsic goods.6 It is also es-
sential to this class that its members are intrinsic evils. As Cross and Woozley
say, they are things we choose Òin spite of what they are in themselves.Ó
7
Several things  make this  point  clear. First, members of this  class are
characterized as painful or laborious (¤pÛponon: 357c, 358a, 364a; cf. 365b).
Secondly, they are dif￿ cult or irksome (xalepñn: 358a, 364a; cf. 364d).8
Thirdly, in themselves they are to be avoided (aétò diƒ aêtò feukt¡on)
6 This applies to Terry IrwinÕs characterization of the third class in his books on
PlatoÕs ethics, PlatoÕs Moral Theory, and PlatoÕs Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1995) (hereafter PE). PMT  (184) says the third class of goods contains those
Òchosen only for their consequences.Ó  PE (181) says  the third class includes those
goods Òwe value for their consequences but not for their own sake.Ó Both characteri-
zations fail to exclude from the third class such things as walking and running that
are in themselves indifferent. This misunderstanding is important since, as we will see
later, it undermines IrwinÕs main objection to the view that the fact that x has causal
consequences which are goods may be relevant to determining that x is good in itself.
PE (185) may no longer maintain the same view as PMT. But even there, doing what
is just, in the view set out by Glaucon, is described as something we  are averse to
because we are Ògiving up something attractive.Ó That is, Irwin sees it as involving
the absence of a good, not the presence of an evil.
7 R.C. Cross and A.D. Woozley, PlatoÕs Republic (London: Macmillan, 1971), 66.
8 The references to 364, which is part of AdeimantusÕ speech, shows that no dis-
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(358a). ÒTo be avoidedÓ (feukt¡on) is the opposite of Òworthy of choiceÓ
(aßretñn), and  as  it is what  is good  in  itself that  is  worth  choosing  for
itself, so it is what is evil in itself that is to be avoided for its own sake.
9
There is no other explanation of why this third class should be described
as Òto be avoided.Ó Since members of this class are good for their con-
sequences, it could not be because of their consequences that they are Òto
be  avoided.Ó In any  case,  the  claim is that  they  are to  be  avoided  Òfor
themselves,Ó so their consequences  are irrelevant to the question  of why
they are to be avoided. The only remaining alternative would be that this
third class is – in itself – neutral, but then again there would be no basis
for describing  its  members as  in  themselves  to  be  avoided:  why  should
walking and sitting – the GorgiasÕ (468a) intermediates – be described as
in themselves to be avoided?   
Nor  would  the  ￿ rst  two  descriptions  of  members  of  this  class  make
sense if they were things which are in themselves indifferent. For exam-
ple, walking is not in itself painful or laborious,  or dif￿ cult or irksome.
Fourthly, when Glaucon says that most people put justice into the third
class of goods (358a), he says that they regard it as something that is not
good  but rather as something  that is necessary (￿nagkaÝon) and they do
it unwillingly  (￿kontew: 358c,  359b;  cf. 360c,  366d).  Walking  or sitting,
which belong to the GorgiasÕ intermediates, are not things that could  be
said  to  be,  in  themselves,  things  that  we  do  unwillingly.  ÒUnwillinglyÓ
means not merely that we have no positive desire to do the thing in ques-
tion but that we have a positive desire not to do it. It is what we regard
as evil that we do unwillingly. People consider items in the third category
as Ònot goodÓ because, although  they belong to the third class of goods,
this means only that they are instrumental goods. They are intrinsic evils.10
Take the example  of treatment when ill, which Glaucon  gives  (357c)
9 Cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1104b30-32, 1153b1-2, 1172b18-20, 1175b24-
25, Topics III, De Anima 431a15-16. 
10 The fact that the many can say that justice is Ò￿ neÓ (kalñn: 364a) does not mean
that they do not regard it as an evil (kakñw). Polus in the Gorgias is committed to the
same sort of position, which allows the same thing to be both ￿ ne and evil, or both
disgraceful and good (cf. Rep. 348e). He holds (474c-d; cf. 482d-e) that doing what
is unjust is a good (￿gayñn) but disgraceful, and hence not ￿ ne (kalñw), since dis-
graceful is the opposite of ￿ne. Polus thinks that the ￿ ne must be distinguished from
the good and the evil must be distinguished from the disgraceful, as he holds that to
do injustice is good but disgraceful and to suffer injustice is evil but not disgraceful.
Cf. Gorgias 482d-e, 488e-489a.314 ROBERT HEINAMAN
to illustrate the kind of thing he wants to put into the third class. A sim-
ilar example is given in the Gorgias (467c), where Socrates mentions tak-
ing a drug and suffering for the sake of health. This is not something we
regard  with  indifference,  as  we  regard  walking  or  sitting  (Gorg.  468a).
Taking  a painful  drug is given  as an example of a positive evil and we
do it because its good consequences outweigh its intrinsic evil.11
When Glaucon says that the many put justice between the best and the
worst (359a-b), he does not mean that it belongs to the class of things that
are indifferent. What he says is slightly misleading since he is using Òjus-
ticeÓ to refer not simply to acting justly but to the combination of doing
what is just and not being treated unjustly  (359a2). The situations  being
compared are
1. acting unjustly  and not paying any penalty
2. acting justly and not being treated unjustly
3. being treated unjustly without the power of revenge.
GlauconÕs statement  that  the  many put  justice  between the best and  the
worst means that 2 is intermediate in order of preference between the best
– 1  – and  the  worst  – 3  (cf.  344c).  There  is no  warrant for  taking  the
view  attributed  to  the  many  in  this  passage  to  contradict  their  view,
reported on the previous page (358a), that justice belongs to the third class
of goods.
PlatoÕs division between three classes of goods picks out three of a pos-
sible six classes of goods and evils:
1. Things that are good in themselves and good for their consequences.
2. Things that are good in themselves and have evil consequences.
3. Things  that are good  in themselves and  have  no good  or evil conse-
quences.
4. Things that are evil in themselves and evil for their consequences.
5. Things that are evil in themselves and have good consequences.
6. Things  that  are  evil  in  themselves  and  have  no  good  or  evil  conse-
quences.
(1)  is PlatoÕs  second  class,  (3) his  ￿ rst class,  and  (5)  his  third  class  of
Ògoods.Ó  Glaucon  and  Adeimantus  will  present  the  view  that  justice
belongs to (5) and injustice belongs to (2),12 while Socrates will argue that
11 Cf. Protagoras 354a-c.
12 And in the best circumstances where perfect injustice is attainable the evil con-
sequences can be avoided.PLATOÕS DIVISION OF GOODS IN THE REPUBLIC 315
justice belongs to (1) and injustice belongs to (4). Things that are neutral
but have good or evil consequences  play no role in the argument of the
Republic, and they are passed over in silence.
13
Intrinsic Goodness and Causal Consequences 
Does Plato believe that all causal consequences  of an item x are conse-
quences  of x, and hence irrelevant to the issue  of xÕs intrinsic goodness
or evil? Or do some causal consequences fall outside of the class of con-
sequences  (as that term is used by Plato)14 so that they may be relevant
to determining whether something is good in itself? I think it is clear that
Plato allows that certain kinds of causal consequences  can establish that
something is good in itself. 
First argument that the casual consequences of x may be relevant to its intrin-
sic goodness
My ￿ rst argument that the causal consequences of something may be rel-
evant to establishing its intrinsic goodness or evil is based on two claims:
(1) The arguments of Glaucon and Adeimantus in defense of injustice are meant
to prove that it is good in itself, and hence they show what sort of consid-
eration may be relevant in establishing that something is good in itself.
(2) The arguments offered by Glaucon and Adeimantus to show that injustice is
good in itself appeal to the causal consequences of injustice.
I offer two arguments in support of (1). To begin with, all parties to the
discussion in the Republic agree that the consequences of justice are goods
and the consequences  of injustice are evils.
15 Several points show this. 
(i) Socrates obviously believes that the normal consequences of justice
are good (612a-614a), and the many are said (358a) to put justice into the
third class of goods, viz. the class of things which are evil in themselves
13 There is a passing reference to things that are neither good nor evil in Book XÕs
argument for the immortality of the soul (609b).
14 Plato uses ÒtŒ ￿pobaÛnontaÓ and ÒtŒ gignñmena ￿pò xÓ as synonyms (357b6,
8, c1-2, d1-2, 358a2).
15 Cf. Reeve, Philosopher-Kings, 25. Foster (ÒA Mistake of PlatoÕs in the Republic,Ó
387) claims that Glaucon and Thrasymachus regard justice as good neither in itself
nor for its consequences. But his view is based on the claim that Plato regards the
reputation for justice as a third class good whose consequences are distinct from the
consequences of justice. IÕll argue below that Plato identi￿ es the consequences of jus-
tice with the consequences of the reputation for justice.316 ROBERT HEINAMAN
but which have good consequences. So both Socrates and the many agree
that the consequences  of justice are goods.    
(ii) Agreement about  the consequences  of justice and  injustice  comes
out  in  GlauconÕs  setting  up  of  the  question  which  the  Republic is  sup-
posed to answer. For in order to focus on the worth of justice and injus-
tice themselves he considers a case where the consequences of justice are
given to the unjust man and the consequences of injustice are given to the
just man (361a-d). And the consequences of justice are all good (362b-c;
cf. 363a-d) and the consequences of injustice are all evil (361e-362a;  cf.
363d-e). Glaucon is setting out the view of the many, so the many as well
as  Plato  accept  the  point  that  the  consequences  of  justice  are good  and
the consequences  of injustice are evil. Thus, when in Book X we ￿ nally
come to the end of the argument that justice is an intrinsic good and injus-
tice  an  intrinsic  evil  (612c),  Socrates  refers to  Book  IIÕs detachment  of
justice and injustice from their usual consequences (360e-362c) and says
(612c-d):
I granted your request that the just man should be reputed unjust, and the unjust
man just, even though it would be impossible that the falseness of their reputa-
tions should escape both gods and men. I yielded in this for the sake of argu-
ment, so that justice itself could be judged with respect to injustice itself. . . since
that judgement has now been made, I ask on behalf of justice the return of the
reputation it has in fact among gods and men . . .
(iii) Agreement between  Socrates  and the many  on the point  that  the
consequences  of  justice  are  good  and  the  consequences  of  injustice  are
evil is also shown by AdeimantusÕ speech. Reversing GlauconÕs argument
which explained  how  the many praise injustice and condemn  justice, he
considers  how  the  many  praise  justice  and  condemn  injustice  (362e).
When people  praise justice  they  do  not praise justice  for itself but  only
because of its good consequences (362e-363e, 366d-e). So the many agree
that  justice  has  these  bene￿ cial  consequences.  With  respect  to  the  con-
demnation of injustice,  Adeimantus points out that it is only  condemned
for its  consequences:  people  attribute  to the  unjust  Òall the punishments
which  Glaucon  enumerated  in  the  case of the just  with  a reputation  for
injustice, but they have nothing else to sayÓ (363d; cf. 366e, 367b-c), i.e.
in blaming injustice they say nothing about its being evil in itself. 
(iv)  This  agreement  on  the  value  of  the  consequences  of  justice  and
injustice is also shown by the fact that the bene￿ cial consequences of jus-
tice which Glaucon and Adeimantus mention in Book II are the same as
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the  consequences  of  justice  and  injustice.  With  regard  to  the  rewards
which men grant to the just, Socrates says:
Will you allow me to say about them [the just] what you yourself said about the
unjust?16 I shall say that, when they get older, just men ￿ ll the public of￿ ces of
their own city if they wish [cf. 362b2, 363a3], marry into any family they want
to [cf. 362b3, 363a3], give their children in marriage to anyone they wish [cf.
362b3], and all you said about the unjust I now say about the just.
Socrates  explicitly  states  that  he  agrees  with  the  view  of  the  many,  as
described by Glaucon and Adeimantus, about the bene￿ cial consequences
of justice.
17 It is true that the consequences of injustice listed by Glaucon
and Adeimantus  (361e-362a)  are not  identical with  the  consequences  of
injustice mentioned by Socrates in Book X (612e, 613b-e). But the pun-
ishments mentioned are identical (361e4-5, 613e1-2), and, in any case, it
is clear that all regard the consequences  of injustice as evils.
Since both sides to the argument agree on the value of the consequences
16 Because, for the sake of argument, the perfectly unjust man was given the rep-
utation for justice and this reputation and its consequences are now being returned to
the just man (612c-e).
17 There are differences between Books II and X with regard to the response of the
gods to justice and injustice. In the earlier passage Glaucon is setting out the view of
the many that the gods will treat well those who are really unjust because the gods
are immoral enough to be bribed by the unjust (362c; cf. 364b-365a, 365e-366b). This
is part of GlauconÕs argument on behalf of the many that injustice is good in itself.
In Book X (612d-613b), with the virtue of the gods restored, their response to justice
and injustice is based on their knowledge of the characters of the just and the unjust,
and is part of the reason why justice is good for its consequences while injustice is
bad  for its consequences. The response of the gods is also used by Adeimantus in
Book II to argue that justice is good not for itself but for its consequences (363a-e).
He reverses GlauconÕs procedure to examine in what way the many praise justice, and
argues that they praise it only for its consequences.
The quoted passageÕs list of bene￿ cial consequences of justice proves that the Republic
is not arguing merely that the just man is better off in the ideal city (cf. R.W. Hall,
ÒJustice and the Individual in the Republic,Ó Phronesis4 (1959), 151, 158). The bene￿cial
consequences regarding marriage and going into politics Òif they wishÓ are not avail-
able to PlatoÕs prime examples of just men in the ideal city, the guardians. Likewise,
591d-eÕs  remarks on  how  the  just man  will  acquire wealth could not  apply to  the
guardians. And Plato goes on to say that the just man he is talking about will only
go into politics if by divine luck he lives in the ideal city (592a). The argument of
the Republic aims to show that justice pays ÒanyoneÓ (589d), including the man with
the ring of Gyges (612b), so it is also wrong to say that the argument claims merely
that justice pays the philosopher.318 ROBERT HEINAMAN
of justice and injustice,18 their disagreement about the value of justice and
injustice can  only  concern the intrinsic  value of justice and  injustice.  In
which case it is clear that the arguments which Glaucon and Adeimantus
bring forward to demonstrate that injustice is a good  thing are meant to
show how it is good in itself.19
A second argument for (1): That the praise of injustice contained in the
speeches  of  Glaucon  and  Adeimantus  is  meant  to  indicate  its  intrinsic
goodness  is also proved by GlauconÕs statement (358d4-6) that he wants
to hear Socrates defend justice in the same way as he himself will praise
injustice. The ÒwayÓ in question,  the manner in which Glaucon wants to
hear  justice  praised,  is  clearly  speci￿ ed  by  his  immediately  preceding
statement that ÒI want to hear it [justice] praised for itselfÓ (358d1-2); and
by his previous  assertion (358b) that he wants to hear the nature of jus-
tice  and  injustice,  and  their  effects  on  the  soul,  not  an  account  their
rewards and consequences.20
So: Glaucon  says that he wants to  hear Socrates  praise  justice in the
same way he is about to praise injustice. He wants Socrates to praise jus-
tice by showing  that it is good  in itself. Therefore, the reasons Glaucon
18 This is part of the explanation of why, when GlauconÕs initial speech compares
the lives of the just and the unjust in order to assess their relative happiness and unhap-
piness, he contrasts the extreme case of injustice with the just man who is thought to
be unjust (360e1-6). For Glaucon is arguing for the claim that the unjust is better off
than the just, and it is in the extreme case of injustice where the unjust man can keep
his injustice hidden (361a4-5; cf. 365c-d) that the evil consequences of injustice (described
in 361e4-362a3; cf. 363d-e) are avoided (360e6-361b5; cf. 366b3-4). So it is only in
the extreme case of injustice where these evil consequences of injustice are avoided
that there is any plausibility in saying that the unjust life is better than the just life. 
The claim that, ordinarily, the unjust life is overall worse than the just life is a pre-
supposition of GlauconÕs explanation of the origin and nature of justice at the start of
his speech. It is only because ordinary people are unable to avoid the consequences
of injustice that they prefer to make an agreement to be just and thus avoid injustice
themselves (359a6-b4), and GlauconÕs argument takes this to be a rational decision.
In theory they rank higher than this compromise the situation where they are unjust
and avoid punishment for their unjust behavior (359a6). But as things actually are,
given the world and their own powers as they exist, ordinary people are unable to
avoid the consequences of injustice (359b1, b6). Though they regard injustice as an
intrinsic good and justice as an intrinsic evil, they rank {injustice + the consequences
of injustice} as worse than {justice + the consequences of justice}, and these are their
only options in  the real world. But that  means that  they rank the  consequences of
injustice as so bad that their evil outweighs any bene￿ ts from injustice. 
19 As noted by Cross and Woozley, PlatoÕs Republic, 69.
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goes on to give for preferring injustice to justice are reasons why injus-
tice is supposed to be good Ôin itself,Õ in the sense of the phrase that Plato
has in mind.
So we can af￿ rm:
(1) The arguments of Glaucon and Adeimantus in defense of injustice are meant
to prove that it is good in itself, and hence they show what sort of consid-
eration may be relevant in establishing that something is good in itself.
But we can also af￿ rm
(2) The arguments offered by Glaucon and Adeimantus to show that injustice is
good in itself appeal to the causal consequences of injustice.
To begin with, at 359c-d, while explaining  why Òinjustice is much more
pro￿ table to [the unjust agent] than justice,Ó i.e. why injustice is supposed
to be an intrinsic  good,  the desire for undue  gain (pleonejÛa) is said to
be the motive for unjust  action (cf. 366a1-3). But clearly enough,  in the
standard  cases which Plato mentions such as the desire for more wealth
than is oneÕs due, the gain one gets from unjust action is a causal conse-
quence of the action,  not the action itself. It is because people  want the
money that will result from unjust action that people do what is unjust.21
Hence, Glaucon is saying that it is because unjust action produces undue
gain that unjust action is seen by people as intrinsically good.
Undue gain, i.e. the possession of more than oneÕs due, is not a part of
the action of acting unjustly. A can steal from B and hand over the goods
to C. Then C, not A, will (let us suppose) have more than his due.
22
It might be said that in this case unjust action is not an intrinsic good
to A, but I use this example merely to show that the undue possession of
a good is not a part of an unjust action but a causal consequence of unjust
action.  And  when,  as  in  the  normal  case  envisioned  by  Glaucon,  A
unjustly takes BÕs goods and as a causal consequence has more than his
due, Glaucon takes this to show that injustice is an intrinsic good, i.e. the
unjust action is taken to be an intrinsic good because of a causal conse-
quence of the action.
Other passages  in the speeches  of Glaucon  and Adeimantus  reinforce
the point that the causal consequences of unjust action play a role in argu-
ing  for  its  intrinsic  goodness.  At  360b-c,  in  the  case  of  the  man  with
21 I, like Plato, will ignore cases of people who steal simply for the joy of stealing.  
22 This is evidently PlatoÕs view of the matter too. For example, at 591a the pos-
session of goods is a result of (¤k) an unjust action. Cf. Laws 862c.320 ROBERT HEINAMAN
GygesÕ ring, we get some examples of unjust actions, including taking the
property of another. Taking the property of another would clearly not be
ÒwelcomedÓ if it did not result in oneÕs being free to possess and use the
stolen property. Again, if I stole the goods and handed them over to some-
body else, I would have committed an unjust act but to me the act would
(at least in this regard) have no value. Glaucon is explaining why people
regard unjust action as an intrinsic good,
23 and he construes the example
given  with GygesÕ ring as providing  the reason why people  regard it as
an  intrinsic  good  (360c-d).  So  unjust  action  is  regarded  as  an  intrinsic
good because of a causal consequence of the action.
23 Irwin (PE, 184) describes the case of GygesÕ ring as one where Glaucon Òpoints
out that if we value justice for its consequences, we must admit it is no longer valu-
able if the good consequences are removed.Ó This may be misleading because there
is no question of removing the good consequences of justice in the case of GygesÕ
ring. It is a case where the consequences of injustice are removed, i.e. the evil con-
sequences that usually ensue on unjust action, in order to show that people do not
value justice for itself. For, Glaucon says, whenever the evil consequences of injus-
tice are eliminated people will choose injustice over justice. To have a case where the
good consequences of justice are removed we would need an example in which some-
one does what is just but does not receive the usual rewards of justice. No such case
is considered in the passage with GygesÕ ring.
Later Irwin says the following when discussing the case of GygesÕ ring (PE, 187):
ÒGlauconÕs counterfactual suppositions. . . make clearer . . . a consideration that is rel-
evant to our decision in actual circumstances. If the only things that matter are the
consequences of justice and injustice, then we must prefer injustice when it has bet-
ter consequences.Ó But the idea that Òthe only things that matter are the consequences
of justice and injusticeÓ is irrelevant to the case of GygesÕ ring. The aim of this argu-
ment is to establish that injustice is good in itself so it can hardly assume that the only
things that matter are the consequences of justice and injustice. The only counterfac-
tual feature of the situation is that the usual consequences of injustice are removed.
But it is precisely because injustice is considered an intrinsic good and justice is con-
sidered an intrinsic evil that all, according to the argument, would choose injustice if
the usual bad consequences of injustice could be avoided. It is not a situation where
we are supposed to imagine that Òthe only things that matter are the consequences of
justice and injustice.Ó
I also disagree with IrwinÕs description of the overall purpose of the speeches of
Glaucon and Adeimantus. He says (PE, 188) that Òthe four-stage argument is carefully
constructed to show that I cannot both advocate being just purely for its consequences
and give a good reason for being just; if I am concerned only for the consequences
of justice, I must admit that I can secure these by appearing to be just rather than by
being just.Ó But if the normal situation is that I cannot hide my acts, then the normal
situation is that I can appear to do what is just only if I do what is just. So, as in the
social contract theory, I  can both advocate doing what is just purely for its conse-
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At 362b, after listing the bene￿ ts arising from the reputation for justice
(cf. 613d),  i.e.  after listing  the  goods  that  are consequences  of justice,24
Glaucon refers to the intrinsic good of doing what is unjust by saying that
Òbesides all these advantages [i.e. the advantages that follow from the rep-
utation  for justice,  i.e.  the  advantages  which are normally consequences
of  justice],  he  [the  unjust  man]  bene￿ ts  in  the  pursuit  of  gain  (kerda-
Ûnonta) because he does not scruple to practice injustice.Ó The gain that
results from practicing injustice is not the same as the practice itself. 
Even  more  clearly,  the  bene￿ ts  of  injustice  listed  after  this  are  both
causal consequences of injustice and do not depend on the reputation for
justice, and hence25 are not regarded by Plato as consequences of justice: 
Besides all these advantages [that follow from the reputation for justice – 362b2],
he bene￿ ts in the pursuit of gain because he does not scruple to practice injus-
tice. In any contest, public or private, he is the winner, getting the better of his
enemies and accumulating wealth; he bene￿ts his friends and does harm to his
enemies. To the gods he offers grand sacri￿ ces and gifts which will satisfy them,
he can serve the gods much better than the just man, and also such men as he
wants to, with the result that he is likely to be dearer to the gods.26
All of these bene￿ ts are unrelated to the reputation for justice. For exam-
ple,  there  is  no  reason  why  a  wealthy  manÕs  aiding  his  friends  should
depend  on  other  people  thinking  him just.  The bene￿ ts derive  from the
accumulation  of wealth  that follows on unjust  action  by  the unjust  man
and  are part  of why  unjust  action  is supposed  to  be  good  in  itself. But
24 To repeat, Socrates has reversed the connections between justice and injustice on
the one hand and their normal consequences on the other, so that the consequences of
justice are given to the unjust man (and the consequences of injustice to the just man).
There is a clear division between (i) the bene￿ ts for the perfectly unjust man that are
consequences of justice, i.e. those that follow from his misleading reputation for jus-
tice (362b2-4), and (ii) the bene￿ ts of injustice itself (362b4-c6). In the case of the
just man with the reputation for injustice, only the evils that are consequences of injus-
tice are mentioned (361c-362a).
25 As weÕll see later, the consequences of justice which Plato is concerned to rule
out in the assessment of the intrinsic goodness of justice are those that follow from
the reputation for justice. 
26 Note that whereas a few lines later (363a-b) Adeimantus says that the reputation
for justice leads to popularity among the gods, here in 362c the basis for the unjust
manÕs being dear to the gods is not his reputation for justice but the fact that, being
rich as a result of his injustice, he is able to offer the gods Ògrand sacri￿ ces and gifts
which will satisfy them.Ó In 363a the just man is under discussion and justice is praised
for its consequences, while in 362c the unjust man is at issue and it is argued that
injustice is good in itself. Cf. n. 17.322 ROBERT HEINAMAN
these are obviously  causal consequences  of unjust  action and not identi-
cal with it.27
Again, at 364a Adeimantus continues GlauconÕs argument by pointing
out  that  people  regard  unjust  action  as  more  pro￿ table  than  just  action
since  the  unjust  will have  wealth.  As we have  seen  (he  is arguing  that
injustice is good in itself and assumes that its consequences are evils), in
saying  that people  regard injustice  as pro￿ table, Adeimantus  means that
they regard it as good in itself. And it is the fact that unjust action leads
to  the  possession  of  wealth  which  is  said  to  explain  why  injustice  is
regarded as pro￿ table. The possession  of wealth is a causal consequence
of unjust action, and the fact that unjust action has this as a causal con-
sequence is taken to show that unjust action is good in itself.
Glaucon  and  Adeimantus  are  defending  the  view  put  forward  by
Thrasymachus in Book I (357a, 358b-c, 367a). Since they defend the view
that justice is evil in itself and injustice is good in itself, ThrasymachusÕ
position is that justice is evil in itself and injustice is good in itself. Thus,
Thrasymachus  is said  to  hold  the  view  that  justice  belongs  to  the  third
class  of goods  (358a;  cf.  358b7-c7),28 so  he  regards  it  as  evil  in  itself.
27 These examples of causal consequences of injustice which are supposed to make
it good in itself rule out WhiteÕs suggestion that when x is an intrinsic good because
it is the aitia of some effect, the connection between cause and effect is a kind of non-
empirical synthetic necessity (ÒThe Classi￿ cation of Goods in PlatoÕs Republic,Ó 408).
The  connection between injustice and aiding oneÕs  friends is not  the  same  as that
between three and odd.
Also, WhiteÕs view (ÒThe Classi￿ cation of Goods in PlatoÕs Republic,Ó 395) that
Òx is good for itselfÓ means that x Òby itselfÓ leads to happiness cannot be right. Plato
asserts that health is good for itself but he obviously does not believe that health by
itself leads to happiness. Nor do I see any reason to believe that Plato thinks that the
tortured just man is happy, contrary to WhiteÕs position that, since justice is good in
itself, justice necessitates happiness. Likewise, although the many think that injustice
is good in itself, they think that the normal consequences of injustice are evils – being
whipped, stretched on the rack, imprisoned, having oneÕs eyes burned out, and being
impaled (361e; cf. 613d-e). It is unlikely that they regard such a man as happy. 
28 Irwin is surprised by the fact that when justice is put into the third class of goods,
Socrates says that justice Òhas previously been condemned by Thrasymachus for hav-
ing this characterÓ (358a). For, Irwin says, ÒThrasymachus did not say that justice was
any sort of good at allÓ (PE, 181). But what Thrasymachus says about ordinary injus-
tice suggests that he could agree that, normally, justice has valuable consequences. For
he did point out the evil consequences of ordinary injustice (344b), i.e. injustice that
is not able to avoid punishment and the opprobrium of others. Only injustice done in
secret (as in the extreme case of GygesÕ ring) or on a large scale (as in the case of a
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And, clearly enough,  he holds that injustice is good in itself (cf. 358e3).
Hence, the reasons which Thrasymachus brings forward for praising injus-
tice and  for condemning  justice  can  also  be  taken  to  indicate  what,  for
Plato, makes something good or evil in itself.
At 343d-344a Thrasymachus points out evil causal consequences of jus-
tice. They are all independent  of the reputation for justice, and therefore
they  provide  reasons  for  saying  that  justice  is evil  in  itself. The  causal
consequences  of justice are listed as follows:
1. In  contracts  with  other  people,  Òwhen  the  partnership  endsÓ  the  just
have less than the unjust. 
2. In payment of tax, the just man acts justly and as a result pays more
than others. A result of the action is that the just man has less money.
3. In the distribution of bene￿ ts the just man gets less.
4. When  holding  public  of￿ ce,  the  affairs  of  the  just  man  deteriorate
through neglect and he receives nothing  from holding  his of￿ ce since
he is honest.
5. The just man is disliked  by his household  and acquaintances  because
he refuses to do them unjust favors.
Clearly, at least (1), (2), (4) and (5) describe causal consequences of jus-
tice. Injustice is said to be good because then the opposite of (1)-(5) holds
(343e), so the corresponding points describe good causal consequences of
injustice which are independent of the reputation for injustice. Hence (see
below)29 they  are arguments  that  injustice is good  in itself. This ￿ ts the
So although Thrasymachus says that injustice is pro￿ table and justice is not pro￿ table
(348c), his position is that it is only large scale or secret injustice that is pro￿ table
(344c, 348b, d; cf. 345a). Likewise, it is reasonable to suppose, Thrasymachus may
think that, ordinarily, justice has good consequences, while it is a worse option for
one who is in a position to be unjust in secret or to practice large scale injustice which
involves the ability to avoid punishment. 
It is possible that the statement at 358a that ÒJustice has now for some time been
objected to by Thrasymachus on this scoreÓ only picks out the point that justice Òis
to be avoided in itself for being dif￿ cult,Ó rather than that fact plus the claim that it
has good consequences. But the point remains that Thrasymachus agrees that injustice
normally has evil consequences. The fact that he thinks there may be exceptions to
this rule does not affect the point since, as weÕll see (and as should be clear already),
Plato does not think that what he calls the consequences of x must always or neces-
sarily follow from x.
29 Where I argue that, for Plato, it is only the good or bad causal consequences of
justice and injustice that  follow from the reputation for one or the other that provide
reasons for saying that they are good or evil for their consequences.324 ROBERT HEINAMAN
previously  noted  point  that  all  parties  to  the  discussion,  including
Thrasymachus, agree that injustice has evil consequences and justice has
good consequences. So ThrasymachusÕ arguments against justice must be
designed to show that it is evil in itself. 
Second argument that the casual consequences of x may be relevant to its intrin-
sic goodness
Strong  evidence  that  the  causal  consequences  of  x may  be  relevant  in
establishing  its  intrinsic  value  is  provided  by  PlatoÕs  comment  on  the
course of the argument of the Republic at 612a-d.
30 There, he points  out
that  he  has  hitherto  been  arguing  for  the  superior  value  of  justice  over
injustice by considering  justice and injustice themselves apart from their
consequences,  and that he will now, for the ￿ rst time, turn to their con-
sequences. This proves that all that has gone before is understood by Plato
to have presented reasons why justice is good in itself and injustice is evil
in itself. 
If so,  it follows  that  the  causal  consequences  of justice  and  injustice
matter for establishing that the ￿ rst is good in itself and the latter is evil
in itself. For earlier (588b-590a) Plato argued that just action is good because
it promotes psychic justice, while unjust action is evil because it promotes
psychic  injustice.  It is clear that psychic  justice is a causal consequence
of just action and that psychic injustice is a causal consequence of unjust
action. And according to 612a-d, the fact that just and unjust actions have
these effects establishes that one is good in itself and the other is evil in
itself. Hence, the causal consequences  of something  may determine it to
be good or evil in itself.31
30 As others have recognized. See Kirwan, ÒGlauconÕs Challenge,Ó 170-71; White,
ÒThe Classi￿ cation of Goods in PlatoÕs Republic,Ó 401; Cross and Woozley, PlatoÕs
Republic, 62. Cf. Reeve, Philosopher-Kings, 25. White correctly points out that 612
suf￿ ces to refute the view that Book IXÕs argument that the just life is more pleasant
than the unjust life is not an argument that justice is good in itself.
31 Note too 613e-614aÕs contrast between the good consequences of justice with the
ÒgoodsÓ provided by justice itself which make it good in itself. If a plurality of goods
provided by justice itself makes it good in itself, then the presence of the single good
justice itself cannot be the sole thing that makes it good in itself.
Irwin (PMT,  210-11) describes the argument of  588b-590a as though it were an
argument that just action is good because of its consequences. He does not mention
612Õs clear implication that 588-90, together with everything else up to 612 said in
defense of justice, is meant to establish that justice is good in itself. PE too does not
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Further, for the same reason that the speeches of Glaucon and Adeimantus
indicate what, for Plato, makes something good in itself, the discussion of
the degenerate constitutions and men in Book VIII indicate what can make
something  evil  in  itself.  For  Glaucon  and  Adeimantus  want  Socrates  to
show not only that justice is good in itself but that injustice is evil in itself
(366e,  367b,  d).  As 612  shows,  all that  has preceded  is relevant  to  this
proof. Hence, the discussion  of unjust men in the discussion  of different
types of men and constitutions is part of the argument that injustice is evil
in itself. 
Take, for example, the extreme case of the tyrannical man. The follow-
ing  evils  will apply  to  him  as  causal  consequences  of his  injustice:  the
satisfaction of his old desires no longer affords any pleasure (574a, 577e-
578a,  579e), he is full of fear, convulsions  and pain (578a,  579b,  e), he
is friendless (576a, 580a). For Plato, these causal consequences  of injus-
tice show how it is evil in itself.32
32 The fact that x may be considered an intrinsic good because of its causal con-
sequences may even be built into PlatoÕs initial description of the ￿ rst class of goods,
which are welcomed for themselves but not for their consequences. At 357b5-8 Plato
says that they are things which we do not welcome for their consequences 
but welcome for their own sake, such as enjoyment (xaÛrein) and the harmless
pleasures (²donaÛ) from which nothing comes to be at a later time other than
enjoyment (xaÛrein). (￿llƒ aétò aêtoè §neka ￿spazñmenoi, oåon tò xaÛrein
kaÜ  aß  ²donaÜ  ÷sai  ￿blabeÝw  kaÜ  mhd¢n  eÞw  tòn  ¦peita xrñnon diŒ  taætaw
gÛgnetai ￿llo µ xaÛrein ¦xonta.)
It is at least plausible to suppose that xaÛrein and ²don® are distinct since the ￿rst is
said to come to be from the second. If they are distinct, then it is very plausible to
say that ²don® is a kind of activity and xaÛrein is the sensation of pleasure that it
produces (cf. Sachs, ÒA Fallacy in PlatoÕs Republic,Ó 209). In which case Plato will
be saying that a kind of activity (²don®) can be counted as an intrinsic good because
of the pleasure (xaÛrein) it causes.
Irwin (PMT, 325, n. 8) claims that Òfrom which nothing comes to be at a later time
other than pleasure (xaÛrein)Ó in the quoted sentence applies to the previous xaÛrein
(in tò xaÛrein kaÜ aß ²donaÛ in b7) as well as aß ²donaÛ. If so, Irwin argues, it can-
not be that Plato is saying that the xaÛrein which Òcomes to be at a later timeÓ is a
causal consequence of ²donaÛ since then he would also, absurdly, be saying that that
second xaÛrein is a causal consequence of xaÛrein, i.e. of itself. Hence, the quoted
sentence cannot be saying that pleasures that are sensations are caused by pleasures
that are activities.  
IrwinÕs objection fails because it rests on the unjusti￿ able assumption that Òfrom
which nothing comes to be at  a  later time other than enjoyment (xaÛrein)Ó  cannot
modify ²donaÛ alone. But it can, and if it does Plato is giving two examples of things
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Irwin argues that the causal consequences of something cannot be rel-
evant to its intrinsic goodness. He says (PMT, 325, n. 8) that, on this view,
Plato will have problems distinguishing the ￿ rst and second class of goods
from the third class of goods. The objection is repeated in PlatoÕs Ethics
(190-91) where he says that the supposition  that the causal consequences
of an item might help to determine whether it is an intrinsic good Òdoes
not explain why Plato divides the second from the third class of goods in
the  way  he  does.Ó  For,  he  says,  even  if  exercise  on  its  own
33 (one  of
PlatoÕs examples of the third class of good) normally produces health, it
is  clear  that  Plato  would  put  it  into  the  third  class,  not  the  second.
Whereas, on the proposal that the causal consequences of x may be rele-
vant to making it an intrinsic good,  Irwin thinks, exercise should  be put
into  the second  class since it causes a good  consequence  and  hence,  on
the proposal, should count as good in itself.
But  IrwinÕs  objection  is a result  of  his  own  misunderstanding  of  the
third class of goods. He evidently thinks that they include things that are
neutral in themselves but have good causal consequences. For all he says
about  them in  PMT (184) is that  they  are Ògoods  chosen  only  for their
consequences,Ó not taking into account the point, argued above, that any
member  of  the  third  class  of  goods  is  an  intrinsic  evil.  The  misunder-
standing becomes clear when he says (PMT, 185): ÒWhen Socrates agrees
that justice is a b-good [i.e., belongs to the second class of goods], . . . he
rejects the position of Book I, and equally of the Gorgias and the Socratic
dialogues, which all treat justice as a c-good [i.e., as belonging to the third
class].Ó Irwin can say this only if he thinks that the third class of goods
includes things that are, in themselves, neutral or indifferent. For it would
be absurd to claim that Socrates ever suggests that justice is an intrinsic
evil, and I assume that Irwin does not ascribe such a view to Socrates. 
In  fact,  unlike  the  Gorgias,  the  RepublicÕs  classi￿ cation does  not
include  any  class of things  that  are in  themselves  neutral  or indifferent.
Once we acknowledge the point that PlatoÕs third class of goods includes
(1) enjoyment (xaÛrein), and 
(2) the harmless pleasures (²donaÛ) from which nothing comes to be at a later time
other than enjoyment (xaÛrein).
If this is what Plato means, then (2) may be saying that some ²donaÛ are intrinsic
goods because of their causal consequences. 
33 Irwin is addressing the proposal that the fact that a good is a consequence of x
counts for  x being an  intrinsic good only if  x has  that  consequence in normal cir-
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only intrinsic evils, the interpretation that sees the causal consequences of
x as possibly  relevant to determining its intrinsic goodness  has no prob-
lem in distinguishing  the second from the third class of goods. All things
that belong to the ￿ rst two classes of goods are not intrinsic evils, while
all  things  belonging  to  the  third  class  of goods  are  intrinsic  evils.  This
suf￿ ces to distinguish  the ￿ rst and second  class of goods  from the third
class  of  goods.  Exercise  is  excluded  from  the  second  class  of  goods
because it is an intrinsic evil. 
II
If Plato  allows  that  causal  consequences  of x may be  relevant  to  deter-
mining that x is good  in itself, what are the ÒconsequencesÓ of x which
he wishes to rule out as irrelevant to determining the intrinsic value of x?
With regard to PlatoÕs general division  of goods  into three classes, I do
not  know  the  answer  to  this  question.  I doubt  that  there is  a consistent
interpretation which will handle all of PlatoÕs examples. But it is the case
of justice that interests me here, and in this case the consequences which
Plato wishes to exclude in assessing its intrinsic value are the reputation
for justice and the bene￿ ts that follow from the reputation for justice. In
other  words,  the  consequences  that  follow  for  the  just  man  because  of
other peopleÕs awareness of his justice are those that are irrelevant to its
intrinsic worth.34
The  evidence  for  this  claim  is  overwhelming.  It  can  hardly  be  acci-
dental that in every passage where Plato talks about excluding the conse-
quences of justice from consideration of its intrinsic worth,35 it is the rep-
utation  for  justice  and  the  consequences  following  on  that  reputation
which are at issue. Here are some of them:
1.  358a:  After Socrates says that he  puts  justice into  the class  of goods
that are to be welcomed both for themselves and for their consequences,
Glaucon says: ÒThat is not the opinion  of the many . . .; they would  put
it in  the  wearisome class,  to  be  pursued  for the  rewards and  popularity
which come from a good reputation [i.e., for its consequences], but to be
avoided in itself as being dif￿ cult.Ó
34 Here I agree with Jerome Schiller, ÒJust Men and Just Acts in PlatoÕs Republic,Ó
Journal of the History of Philosophy 6 (1968), 5.
35 Rep. 358a, 361b-362c, 362e-363a, 365b, 366d-e, 367b-e, 392b, 392c, 444e-445a,
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This  is  the  ￿ rst  passage  in  which  there  is  a  reference  to  the  conse-
quences of justice, and they are identi￿ ed with the rewards following from
the reputation for justice. The rewards following from a reputation for jus-
tice are distinguished  from any intrinsic value of justice, the many being
said  to  regard  justice  as  evil  in  itself, and  to  think  that  it is rational  to
want it only because of its consequences, viz. the rewards following from
the reputation for justice. 
2. 361b-362c: In comparing the goodness  of the lives of the just and the
unjust, in order to ensure that the just man is one who chooses justice for
itself rather than its consequences,  the just man is deprived  of the repu-
tation for justice, and,  hence, is deprived  of the rewards following  from
the reputation for justice. If there were any other consequences of justice
besides those following from the reputation for justice which Plato wanted
to rule out in assessing its intrinsic worth, then simply excluding the con-
sequences that follow from the reputation for justice would not insure that
the consequences  of justice were not being considered.  With those other
consequences still in the ￿ eld, it would remain possible that the just man
chooses  justice  because  of  those  consequences  of  justice  that  do  not
depend on the reputation for justice instead of choosing justice for itself.
But as Plato  presents  the  case,  excluding  the rewards for the reputation
for justice by itself suf￿ ces to exclude all of the consequences  of justice
which  he  wants  to  put  out  of consideration.  Hence, there are no  conse-
quences of justice which Plato wishes to exclude from consideration other
than those that follow from the reputation for justice.
3. 362e-363a: When Adeimantus takes over GlauconÕs argument, in order
to prove that the many do not value justice itself he points out: 
When fathers speak to their sons, they say one must be just . . . but they do not
praise justice itself, only the high reputations it leads to, in order that the son,
thought to be just, shall enjoy those public of￿ ces, marriages, and the rest which
Glaucon mentioned, as they belong to the just man because of his high repute. 
Here, the only  consequences  of justice  said to  be valued  which are dis-
tinguished from justice itself are good reputation and the goods resulting
from that reputation.
4. 367b: Adeimantus explains what he wants Socrates to do: 
So do not merely give us a theoretical proof that justice is better than injustice,
but tell us how each, in and by itself, affects a man, the one for good, the other
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if you do not deprive them of true reputation and attach false reputations to them,
we shall say that you are not praising justice but the reputation for it, or blam-
ing injustice but the appearance of it . . . 
Adeimantus wants justice itself to be praised and injustice itself to be con-
demned.  But  suppose  that  Plato  thought  that  the  good  consequences  of
justice included other things besides the rewards that follow from the rep-
utation for justice. Then, in praising justice, ignoring the rewards that fol-
low  from  the  reputation  for  justice  would  not  suf￿ ce  to  insure  that
Socrates was not praising justice for its consequences rather than for itself.
For the  possibility  would  remain that  after removing the  bene￿ cial con-
sequences of justice that follow from the reputation for justice, other con-
sequences would remain and that Socrates was praising justice because of
those consequences rather than for itself.  
I could  go on, but the above  passages  prove the point.  In the case of
justice  and  injustice,  the  consequences  which Plato  is concerned  to  rule
out of consideration in deciding whether justice and injustice are good or
evil in themselves are those consequences which follow from the reputa-
tion for each. Hence, causal consequences of justice or injustice which do
not involve the reputation for justice or injustice may be relevant in decid-
ing whether they are good or evil in themselves.
This ￿ ts the evidence set out above  on the causal consequences  men-
tioned by Glaucon and Adeimantus when they present their arguments for
injustice being  good  in  itself: the causal  consequences  which  they  men-
tion are independent  of the reputation  for injustice.  Likewise, the causal
consequences of injustice which Socrates mentions in Book VIII in argu-
ing  that  injustice  is  evil  in  itself  are  independent  of  the  reputation  for
injustice. 
This interpretation  makes it clear why, when Plato ends the argument
for justice being good in itself and points out why it is good for its con-
sequences,  he  speaks  in  terms of the  contrast  between  the  goods  which
follow  from  being just  and  the  goods  which  follow  from  appearing
(dokeÝn) to be just (612d). One has the reputation (dñja) for justice pre-
cisely when one appears to be just to other people. The bene￿ ts that fol-
low from the reality of justice do not depend on such an appearance and
make it good for itself.
There is one serious objection to the proposal that the consequences of
justice  which  Plato  wishes  to  rule  out  of  consideration  in  assessing  its
intrinsic worth are those that follow from the reputation for justice.
36 Consider
36 Cf. Kirwan, ÒGlauconÕs Challenge,Ó 165; Irwin, PE, 182.330 ROBERT HEINAMAN
PlatoÕs examples when he ￿ rst sets out the division of goods at 357b-358a.
Examples of the second  class  of goods  which  are good  for their conse-
quences as well as for themselves are knowledge, sight and health. Examples
of the third class of goods which are good for their consequences include
being treated when ill. Now, whatever the good consequences  of knowl-
edge,  sight,  health  and  being  treated when  ill which  Plato  has  in  mind,
surely many of them must be consequences that do not depend on having
the reputation for these things. 
So, the  objection  goes,  when  Plato  sets out  his  division  of goods,  he
gives as  examples of things  that  are good  for their consequences  things
that are instrumental goods for consequences which do not depend on the
reputation for those things. If, in his own examples, the consequences of
x that matter for determining its instrumental value do not depend on the
reputation for x, how can Plato wish to say that the consequences of jus-
tice that matter for determining its instrumental value depend on the rep-
utation for justice? 
To  this  there  are  two  replies.  First,  the  evidence  cited  above  still
remains.  In particular,  immediately after setting  out  the  general  division
of goods (358a), Plato speci￿ es the consequences  of justice that need to
be  excluded  from the  assessment  of its  intrinsic  value  as  those  rewards
that follow from the reputation for justice. 
Secondly, consider what Plato says when he returns to his division  of
goods in a later passage (367c-d):
Now since you agreed that justice is among the greatest goods – those that are
[a1] worth having for what comes from them but much more [b1] [worth hav-
ing]  for  themselves,  such as  seeing, hearing, thinking, and, of course, being
healthy and all the other goods that are [b2] fruitful by their own nature (gñnima
t» aêtÇn fæsei) but [a2] not [fruitful] because of reputation (￿llƒ oé dñjú) –
praise this aspect of justice, [b3] the way in which it in itself bene￿ ts the man
who has it, and the way in which injustice harms the man who has it; leave [a3]
the rewards and reputations (dñjaw) for others to praise.
This  passage  may  be  open  to  different  readings.  It  might,  perhaps,  be
understood  so that [b2] but not [a2] is explanatory  of [b1] in this sense:
speci￿ cation  of  the  intrinsic  worth  of  seeing,  hearing,  etc.  speci￿ es  the
goods  they  produce  by  their  own  nature  – not  the  goods  they  produce
through  the  reputation  [dñja] for possession  of the  goods,  which would
make them good  for their consequences.  Then,  throughout,  [b] speci￿ es
intrinsic value while [a] concerns the value of a thing for its consequences.
Suppose this is right. The examples of health and sight mentioned here
were also mentioned in the original division of goods at 357c as instancesPLATOÕS DIVISION OF GOODS IN THE REPUBLIC 331
of the second class of goods – things that are good for their consequences
as well as for themselves. And [a1], [a2] and [a3] connect the bene￿ cial
consequences of health and sight with the reputation for possessing them.
So understood, this passage answers the claim that PlatoÕs original exam-
ples at 357c show that the good consequences  of justice in the Republic
are not those which follow from the reputation for justice. For the argu-
ment was that in the examples mentioned – e.g. health and sight  – their
consequences evidently do not depend on the reputation for the things in
question.  But here Plato connects  the consequences  of even these things
to reputation. 
Suppose instead that with [a2] Plato means that health, sight, etc. have
no consequences  that follow from their reputation. That is, on this inter-
pretation, both [b2] and [a2] elucidate [b1]. Nevertheless, when the case
of justice is returned to in [b3] and [a3], the consequences  of justice are
once again tied to the reputation for justice. So, on this interpretation of
[a2], in the same sentence in which Plato mentions some of the examples
from 357c and af￿ rms that their instrumental value has nothing to do with
consequences  resulting from the reputation  for having  them,37 he repeats
the idea of the dependence of the consequences  of justice on possessing
the reputation  for justice. Therefore, on this interpretation of 367c-d, the
fact that 357c mentions examples of goods whose instrumental value has
nothing  to do with reputation cannot show that the instrumental of value
of justice does not depend on the reputation for justice.38
I conclude that Plato regards the causal consequences of x as possibly
relevant  to  assessing  the  intrinsic  value  of x. But  it would  be  wrong  to
think that Plato believes that in all cases it is only the causal consequences
of x that  matter in  determining its intrinsic  value.  Consider  the  view of
the many who hold  that justice is an intrinsic evil because it is dif￿ cult
(xalepñw) and painful or laborious (¤pipñnow) (358a, 364a; cf. 364c-d, 365b),
37 Although I said that the present interpretation construes both 
[b2] fruitful (gñnima) by their own nature (t» aêtÇn fæsei), and 
[a2] not [fruitful] because of reputation (oé dñjú)
as elucidating the idea that these things are [a1] worth having for themselves, the inter-
pretation construes [a2] as meaning that seeing, hearing, etc. have no consequences
because of  their reputation. If so, it follows that the good consequences that make
them good for their consequences include nothing that follows from the reputation for
having them.
38 361b5-362e7 is another passage that contrasts the reality and appearance of jus-
tice (and injustice) (361b7-8, d1, 362e6-7), and connects the appearance of justice with
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and  so  put  it  into  the  third  class  of  goods.  It  is  possible  that  ¤pipñnow
should  be translated  Òpainful,Ó and it is possible  that  Plato  regards pain
and pleasure as a causal consequences of just action. Still, there is no rea-
son  to think  that Plato regards pain as  an intrinsic evil only  because of
its causal consequences. And, in any case, the fact that a kind of behav-
ior such as doing what is just is Òdif￿ cultÓ has nothing to do with its causal
consequences but is rather a feature of the action. However, the fact that
justice is dif￿ cult is offered as a reason why it is evil in itself. Hence, the
fact that x is evil (or good) in itself need not be determined solely by its
causal consequences.39 Being dif￿ cult is not even a ÒformalÓ consequence
of just behavior.
If the  fact that  justice  is dif￿ cult  supports  the  point  that  it is  evil  in
itself, then the fact that injustice is ÒeasyÓ (364a; cf. 364c) must support
the claim that it is good in itself. Being easy is not a causal consequence
of unjust action. 
III
I will conclude by pointing out some other features of PlatoÕs division of
goods  that  are worth  noting.  First,  the  consequences  of x do  not  neces-
sarily follow from x.
40 In order to set up the examination of the intrinsic
value of justice and injustice, Glaucon presents the cases of the just man
who does not enjoy the consequences of justice but instead suffers the con-
sequences of injustice; and of the unjust man who does not suffer the con-
39 Which is not  to deny that  even in  the case  of pain and pleasure their conse-
quences may be relevant to determining their intrinsic worth. At 357b Plato says that
Òharmless pleasures (²donaÛ)Ó are good in themselves. If these pleasures are sensa-
tions of pleasure, Plato may be implying that when they have harmful consequences
they are not good in themselves because of those harmful consequences. It is also pos-
sible, however, that Plato would classify a harmful pleasure as something good in itself
which has evil consequences. This may be the view found at Protagoras 353c-354c.
At 351c-e, pleasure qua pleasure is good. But immediately after 354c we get a dif-
ferent use of ÒgoodÓ and Òevil.Ó Now (354c-e), the overall goodness or evil of x is
assessed by comparing its intrinsic pleasantness or painfulness (goodness or evil) with
its  pleasant or  painful (good or evil) consequences.  SocratesÕ  subsequent  attempt
(354e-355e) to refute the manyÕs explanation of akrasia appears to present a dif￿ culty
only because the difference between these uses of ÒgoodÓ and ÒevilÓ is blurred.
40 Noted by Cross and Woozley, PlatoÕs Republic, 66. Reeve claims (Philosopher-
Kings, 30) that if x is an instrumental good because it brings about y, x is suf￿ cient
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sequences of injustice but enjoys the consequences of justice. While Plato
later points out that this separation of justice and injustice from their con-
sequences was made solely for the sake of argument (612c-d), and that it
is impossible that both gods and men should be ignorant of a manÕs justice
or injustice, there is plainly no reason why someoneÕs justice or injustice
could not escape the knowledge of other people.  Then the consequences
of  justice  or  injustice  that  follow  from  the  knowledge  of  other  people
would not be enjoyed by the just or unjust man. And obviously,  as Plato
clearly knew, even if A is just and has the reputation for justice, a tyrant
might prevent all those goods  which Plato says are the consequences  of
justice. A tyrant may escape at any rate some of the consequences of his
injustice,  or if A is unjust  but not a tyrant,  A may be  clever enough  to
conceal his injustice, or ￿ nd himself in a position  where he can hide his
injustice.  Similarly  with  PlatoÕs  example  of  treatment  for  illness  – the
hoped  for  consequence  of  restoration  to  health  does  not  always  follow.
Consider also the historical Socrates who did not enjoy what Plato would
regard as all the consequences of justice even though, in PlatoÕs view, he
was the most just man of his time (Phaedo 118a, Seventh Letter 324e). 
So:  at  least  not  all  of  the  consequences  of x  that  make  it  an  instru-
mental good necessarily follow from x. It need not be a suf￿ cient condi-
tion for those consequences, and this evidently applies to the consequences
of  justice  and  injustice.  Plato  is  drawing  a  general  distinction  between
types of good, and the claim that y is a consequence of x entails at best
that y usually follows x.
The same  applies  to  those  causal  consequences  that  make x good  or
evil in itself. For example,  while the fact that unjust  action leads to the
accumulation of wealth is given as a reason why injustice is good in itself
in the speeches of Glaucon and Adeimantus,  there is no reason to think
that  Plato  believes  that  this  necessarily  follows,  even  when  the  unjust
action is undertaken to obtain money. Adeimantus says (364a) that Òunjust
deeds are for the most part more pro￿ table than just ones.Ó 
Nor is x on its  own a necessary  condition  for the consequences  of x.
The consequences of x may follow from something other than x: in PlatoÕs
case of the perfectly unjust man, the consequences of justice follow from
the  appearance of justice even when justice  is not  present  in the  unjust
man. So x is not a necessary condition for the consequences of x that make
x good for the sake of its consequences. 
Another  feature  of  PlatoÕs  division  which  has  attracted  little  if  any
notice is this: The notions of intrinsic good and evil are relative to some-
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evil  for  some  person,  the  point  here  is  that  the  same  thing  may  be  an
intrinsic good for A and an intrinsic evil for B.
Glaucon and Adeimantus, while arguing that justice is an intrinsic evil
for the agent, defend ThrasymachusÕ view that justice is anotherÕs good
(367c; cf. 343c), i.e. it is a good for the ÒpatientÓ of the action. Suppose
that Glaucon and Adeimantus,  in saying that AÕs just action is the good
of someone other than A, meant merely that AÕs just action has bene￿ cial
consequences (in PlatoÕs sense) for the patient of the action. Then the view
of  Glaucon  and  Adeimantus  would  be  that,  normally,  the  just  agentÕs
action produces exactly the same kinds of consequences  – namely, good
ones – for both the agent and the patient. For, as noted above, all parties
to the argument agree that, normally, the agentÕs just action produces good
consequences  for  the  agent.  But  it  is  clear  that  the  view  that  justice  is
anotherÕs good means that in the way in which justice is anotherÕs good
it is precisely not the agentÕs good. The only way in which the view set
out by Glaucon and Adeimantus holds that justice is not the agentÕs good
is that it is not good in itself for the agent. So when that view asserts that
justice is the patientÕs good it means that justice is good in itself for the
patient.
Therefore, the view of Glaucon and Adeimantus must be that just action
is  an  intrinsic  evil  for  the  agent  and  an  intrinsic  good  for  the  patient.
Hence,  the  same thing  may be  an  intrinsic  good  for A  and  an  intrinsic
evil for B. 
Since  the  disagreement  between  the  many  and  Socrates  concerns  the
value of just action for the agent, the many put it into the third class of
goods because they believe that it is an intrinsic evil for the agent of the
action even though it is also an intrinsic good for the patient of the action.
But since justice is an intrinsic good from the point of view of the patient,
it cannot belong to the third class of goods and so must, from that point
of  view,  belong  to  the  ￿ rst  or  second  class  of  goods.  Hence,  the  same
thing may fall into different categories of good.
Of course, Plato will go on to argue that justice is an intrinsic good for
the agent. Since all presumably agree that justice is an intrinsic good for
the patient of the action, the same thing can be an intrinsic good for more
than one person, here the agent and the patient of the action. If, as Plato
holds, what is good for a person is based on what is in fact in that per-
sonÕs self-interest, and  if the  self-interest of A is  not  identical  with  the
self-interest of B, then it must be the case that the same thing can be an
intrinsic good  for different reasons.  In the case of just action,  it is clear
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patient will be based on the fact that the patient receives some good from
the  action,  money,  honor  or  whatever.  The  claim  that  just  action  is  an
intrinsic good for the agent will based on the fact that it has certain con-
sequences for the soul of the agent, viz. it promotes justice in the agentÕs
soul  (588b-591e  with  612a-b).  So  different types  of causal  consequence
are relevant to determining whether the action is an intrinsic good.41
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